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Abstract 
In April and November of 2004, the civilian population of Fallujah 
City experienced two extremely violent battles (“the Fallujah 
Battles”) initiated by the Coalition Forces (CF) in Iraq. Marked by 
the killing and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people in 
Fallujah City, the Fallujah Battles raise a number of issues related to 
international humanitarian law (IHL), as well as concerns regarding 
the legal institutions charged with the protection of international 
human rights. This article generally discusses the crime allegedly 
committed against civilians by the CF – which included the USA, 
UK and Iraqi forces – during the Fallujah Battles. The fi rst part 
examines the principal IHL instruments considered in relation 
to acts that were committed during the Battles of Fallujah. The 
discussion then considers whether actions taken against civilians, 
civilian properties and medical units by the CF; and the prohibition 
of International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) from carrying out 
its duties in wartime by the CF amount to violations of IHL. The 
second part considers whether the use of white phosphor constitutes 
a violation of contemporary IHL, particularly in relation to whether 
such weapons can be considered chemical weapons prohibited by 
IHL.  Finally, this article discusses the potential legal mechanisms 
available to prosecute alleged perpetrators of war crimes in Fallujah.
Keywords: Fallujah battles, international humanitarian law, Geneva 
Conventions, war crimes, protection of civilians
Introduction
Following the defeat of the Iraqi military, Coalition Forces (CF), 
comprising predominantly UK and US forces, occupied and 
effectively controlled Iraq. After the effective occupation of Iraq, 
two major assaults were launched on Fallujah City resulting in 
1 Corresponding author.
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civilian casualties (“Fallujah Battles”). On 5 April 2004, the US 
Marines engaged in a military operation in Fallujah, allegedly to 
arrest those responsible for the killing of four US security guards on 
31 March. While Fallujah was under siege by the CF, daily airstrikes 
and other means were employed to achieve the objectives of the 
military operation. Sporadic fi ghting continued in Fallujah until 
the CF handed over control of the city to Iraqi forces. According 
to reports from the health authorities and the media, the number of 
those killed in the fi rst Fallujah Battle in April 2004 numbered at 
least 600 people, with at least half of the casualties being civilians, 
including women and children. In the second Fallujah Battle, in 
November 2004, at least 3,000 civilians were reported to have been 
killed.
The Fallujah Battles resulted in the death and displacement of 
hundreds of thousands of civilians by the members of both the CF 
and Iraqi forces. Thus, it is important for this article to examine the 
acts committed during the Fallujah Battles in light of relevant IHL 
provisions contained within international conventions and treaties, 
including the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva 
Conventions) among other international treaties. The discussion in 
this article will be divided into three parts. The fi rst part provides 
a review of the relevant IHL instruments and examines whether 
the actions taken against civilians, civilian properties and medical 
units by the CF; and the prevention of the International Committee 
of Red Cross (ICRC) from carrying out its mandate during the 
confl icts by the CF amount to violations of IHL and war crimes. In 
the second part, the legality of the use of weapons in the Fallujah 
Battles, such as white phosphorous by the CF, will be examined in 
light of contemporary IHL. The analysis requires an investigation 
into the legality of the use of white phosphorus. Furthermore, 
evidence pertaining to the nature of the use of white phosphorous 
and its impact on the civilian population of the City of Fallujah 
will be considered. Finally, this article considers the potential legal 
mechanisms available to prosecute the alleged perpetrators of war 
crimes in Fallujah. The mechanisms considered include a special 
tribunal established by the United Nations (UN) Security Council;2 
national courts with jurisdiction by virtue of being party to the 
relevant Geneva Conventions or by virtue of membership in the UN; 
and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
2 Hereinafter “Security Council.”
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Before proceeding further, it has to be explained that this article is 
focusing on the violations of IHL by the CF and why such violations 
should be regarded as war crimes. This is because many violations 
of IHL may amount to war crimes. For example, direct attacks on 
residential neighbourhoods are grave breaches of the Additional 
Protocol I (API) and shall be regarded as war crimes according to 
Article 85(5) of the same protocol. Further, according to Article 147 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the destruction and appropriation 
of property is a breach of the Convention. Such acts are considered 
war crimes under Article 85(5) of API. After discussing the 
violations of the IHL by the CF in Fallujah Battles, the violations 
should be viewed appropriately as war crimes, the intentional 
and/or indiscriminate targeting of civilians by military personnel. 
Members of the CF, acting as an occupying power, should bear the 
responsibility of the war crimes committed in Fallujah in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of international conventions.  
Violations of Geneva Conventions and International Conventions 
The section will analyse the actions of the CF during the Fallujah 
battles in light of the relevant IHL instruments. The fi rst part discusses 
the relevant IHL instruments that will be used to analyse the facts 
surrounding the Fallujah Battles. The second part will consider the 
facts surrounding the Fallujah Battles and determine whether the 
CF violated provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 during 
the Fallujah Battles, particularly in respect of the persecution and 
killing of civilians; and whether such actions constituted violations 
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
a) A Review of Relevant IHL Instruments
 
Following the Diplomatic Conference held in Geneva from 
April 21st to August 12th 1949,four Geneva Conventions were 
adopted for the purpose of establishing minimum standards for 
the treatment of members of the armed forces and the protection 
of civilians during times of armed confl ict. Following the adoption 
of the Geneva Conventions, all relevant State parties involved in 
the Battle of Fallujah signed and/or ratifi ed the conventions.3 The 
3 Iraq ratifi ed the Conventions on 14 February 1956; the United Kingdom ratifi ed 
the Conventions on 23 September 1957; and the United States of America rati-
fi ed the Conventions on 2 August 1955.
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standards established by the four Geneva Conventions apply to 
all armed confl icts of an international character, irrespective of 
whether the confl ict is recognised as such by all parties involved 
in the hostilities.4Furthermore, the standards established were also 
created to be applicable in situations where the armed confl ict is 
not considered to be international in character, provided that the 
territory within which the hostilities occur are party to the Geneva 
Conventions.5 In light of the parties involved in the hostilities during 
the Fallujah Battles and the territory within which the hostilities 
occurred, no doubt remains as to whether the Geneva Conventions 
are applicable to the acts which were committed. 
Additionally, two further protocols to the Geneva Conventions were 
adopted and opened for signature in Berne on 12 December 1977. The 
two Additional Protocols6 were adopted in an effort to further develop, 
rather than replace, the existing provisions concerning the protection 
of civilians during armed confl icts; and reinforce the relationship 
between the IHL standards prescribed by the Geneva Conventions 
and existing international human rights norms.7 Unlike the Geneva 
Conventions, the two instruments have not been endorsed by all 
parties involved during the Battles of Fallujah.8Notwithstanding this 
fact, the API has been widely acknowledged and accepted by States 
in the international community;9the substance of its provisions 
have largely been included in subsequent conventions and treaties 
dealing with IHL, including in Article 8 of the Rome Statute of 
4 Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions.
5 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Confl icts (Protocol I) 
[Hereinafter “API”]; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international 
Armed Confl icts (Protocol II) [Hereinafter “APII”].
7 Roberts, Adam and Richard Guelff .Documents on the Law of War. 3rd Ed. Ox-
ford: OUP, 2000. pp. 419-420.
8 The API was ratifi ed by the UK on 28 January 1998; and by Iraq on 1 April 
2010. The United States of America signed the API on 12 December 1977, 
but has not yet ratifi ed the instrument. The APII was ratifi ed by the UK on 28 
January 1998. The United States of America signed the APII on 12 December 
1977, but has not yet ratifi ed the instrument. Iraq has not, as of the writing of 
this article, signed or ratifi ed the APII.
9 Roberts, Adam and Richard Guelff. Documents on the Law of War. 3rd Ed. Ox-
ford: OUP, 2000. pp. 419-420.
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the International Criminal Court;10and the provisions dealing with 
grave breaches have been argued to be customary international law 
by contemporary legal scholars.11The API, which is also relevant to 
the events that occurred during the Fallujah Battles, is potentially 
applicable to the actions committed during hostilities despite the 
fact that it was not ratifi ed by all parties to the confl ict on the basis 
that it was considered to be customary international law at the time 
of the hostilities.
What remains to be determined is whether the Battles of Fallujah 
constituted armed confl icts within which civilians and non-military 
personnel were entitled to the protection established under the 
Geneva Conventions and the API. While there is a growing body 
of discourse concerning the applicability of IHL norms to non-
international armed confl icts, the simple matter is that this need 
not be considered in light of the provisions of the international 
instruments considered. Firstly, the Geneva Conventions explicitly 
extend the standards and protections guaranteed within their 
respective texts to situations of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of a State party to the Geneva Conventions.12 The API also 
explicitly extends its protection to the situations described within the 
text of the Geneva Conventions.13Secondly, and most importantly, 
contemporary international legal norms automatically designate an 
armed confl ict as international in nature when the confl ict involves 
foreign intervention. The test applied to determine whether such 
intervention was suffi cient to prove the existence of an international 
armed confl ict involves determining whether the foreign party 
exercised effective control, which, in turn, is determined by the level 
of strategy, personnel and logistics involved in the intervention.14The 
10 Entry into force 1 July 2002.
11 See, Meron, Theodor. Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary 
Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. pp. 62-78; and McDonald, Gabrielle Kirk 
and Olivia Swaak-Goldman. Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Interna-
tional Criminal Law: The Experience of National and International Courts. 
Vol. 1. Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 2000. p. 75-76.
12 Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions.
13 Article 1(3) of the API.
14 McDonald, Gabrielle Kirk and Olivia Swaak-Goldman. Substantive and Proce-
dural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The Experience of National and 
International Courts. Vol. 1. Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 2000. pp. 
80-81.
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magnitude of the intervention and involvement in the hostilities by 
the military forces of the UK and US, acting as part of the CF, clearly 
established this confl ict as international in nature.
b) Evidence on Violations in the Case of Fallujah Battles
The following discussions will show that the CF violated several 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, particularly Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions. The discussions will consider relevant 
evidence to prove that actions taken against civilians, civilian 
properties and medical units by the CF; and the prohibition of the 
ICRC from carrying out its duties in wartime by the CF amount to 
violations of IHL.
i) Attacks against Civilians
The fi rst violation of IHL by the CF occurred in April 2004 as a 
result of the attacks on Fallujah. The hostilities resulted in the deaths 
of nearly 600 persons, the majority of whom were civilian residents. 
Most of the deaths were the direct result of the attacks, as many died 
in their houses after the CF prevented them from leaving the city 
during the fi ghting. Additionally, more than 30 civilians were killed 
after being attacked by an American F-16 fi ghter jet. The civilians 
were attacked while carrying white fl ags and trying to escape from 
the devastating situation within the City.15
The refusal of the CF to allow the citizens safe passage out of the 
City is a violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
These people took no active part in the hostilities and were 
accorded protection under Common Article 3(1) (a) of the Geneva 
Conventions. The direct attacks on residential neighbourhoods by 
the CF are grave breaches of the Additional Protocol I (API) and 
regarded as war crimes according to Article 85 (5) of the same protocol.
After the fi rst battle of Fallujah, the CF planned a subsequent 
attack that led to the second battle of Fallujah, resulting in the 
deaths of thousands of civilians. On 25 and 26 December 2004, the 
15 Testimonies of Crimes Against Humanity in Fallujah, report of Conservation 
Centre of Environmental & Reserves in Fallujah (CCERF) is recorded in Iraqi 
Ministry of Planning & International Cooperative under No. 1Z2129.
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emergency unit of the Fallujah hospital recovered 700 bodies, 550 of 
which were women and children.16The bodies were recovered from 
9 of the 27 residential neighbourhoods.17The CF later announced 
that they had held more than 1,200 bodies in refrigerated stores18 
outside Fallujah.19 Article 50(3) of API provides that the existence 
of individuals within a civilian population that are not considered 
‘civilians’ does not deprive the population of its civilian character. 
However, the CF violated Article 50(3) by targeting anything that 
moved in Fallujah City. According to the testimony of US soldiers 
that served in the US Army during the Fallujah Battles, any person in 
a house was a target to CF soldiers during the battles.  The military 
operations and actions of the CF soldiers wantonly deprived the 
citizens of Fallujah of their civilian character.
In addition, in November 2004, a CF soldier fi red on a wounded 
and unarmed Iraqi at point blank range in Fallujah.20According 
to Amnesty International, the CF soldier claimed to have fi red in 
the direction of a wounded insurgent.21 Killing a wounded person 
is a blatant violation of Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva 
Conventions, as the provision accords protection to such individuals. 
The act was also a violation of Article23 of Hague Convention (IV), 
which forbids the killing or wounding of individuals belonging to a 
hostile nation or army; and the killing or wounding of an enemy who 
has surrendered.22 Furthermore, Article 32 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention prohibits parties to the confl ict from killing or murdering 
of protected persons in their hands, irrespective of whether the acts 
are committed by civilian or military agents. 
16 IRIN, IRAQ: Death Toll in Fallujah Rising, Doctors say, Humanitarian News 
and Analysis Project of the UN Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, accessible at http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=24527 (2 
November2010).
17 Ibid.
18 The store was used for the storing of potatoes.
19 Letter from Fallujah to Kofi  Annan. 2004 accessible at ahttp://www.uruknet.
info/?p=9922 (28October2010).
20 Byers, M. War Law: Understanding International Law and Armed Confl ict, 
Grove Press, New York, 2005, p 127.
21 Amnesty International, MDE 14/056/2004, News Service No: 287, 14 Nov 
2004.
22 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The 
Hague, 18 October 1907.
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According to Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, no 
protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not 
personally committed. However, in the case in question, the actions 
of the CF led to the deaths of many civilians in their homes. As 
noted above, the remains of hundreds of civilians were recovered 
by Fallujah hospital.23 Furthermore, actions involving collective 
penalties, intimidation, terrorism, pillaging and reprisals against 
protected persons and property are prohibited.24 Arguably, the 
actions of the CF amount to collective penalties against civilians and 
their property and, as such, are considered tantamount to violations 
of Article 33.
Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that protected 
persons shall not be subjected to death; torture; inhuman treatment; 
biological experiments that cause great suffering; unlawful 
deportation or transfer; unlawful confi nement; wilful acts causing 
great suffering or serious injury; compulsory service in the forces of 
a hostile power; or deprivation of the right to a fair trial.25 Therefore, 
the civilian deaths, deportation and transfer of Fallujah civilians, as 
well as the inhuman treatment that occurred as a result of action 
taken by the CF, during the Fallujah Battles constitute violations of 
Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 85 of the API.
ii) Attacks on Civilian Objects
During the second Fallujah Battle, the CF attacked residential 
neighbourhoods, resulting in the destruction of a large number of 
buildings.26 Approximately 26,000 houses were partially destroyed, 
while 3,000 more houses were completely destroyed. Additionally, 
70 mosques and 50 schools were destroyed.27The CF need to be 
23 IRIN, IRAQ: Death Toll in Fallujah Rising, Doctors say, Humanitarian News and 
Analysis Project of the UN Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
accessible at http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=24527 (2November2010).
24 Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
25 Aksar, Y. Implementing International Humanitarian Law From The Ad Hoc 
Tribunals To A Permanent ICC,Routledge,USA and Canada, 2004, p 115.
26 Keith, L. The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution. USA: Cambridge 
University Press. 2010, p 186.
27 Testimonies of Crimes Against Humanity in Fallujah, report of Conservation 
Centre of Environmental & Reserves in Fallujah (CCERF) is recorded in Iraqi 
Ministry of Planning & International Cooperative under No. 1Z2129.
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held accountable for the damage caused to civilian properties.28 The 
destruction of these properties cannot be justifi ed and constitute 
crimes against protected properties29under Article 50 of the First 
Geneva Convention. The extensive destruction and appropriation 
of civilian property constitute grave breaches in accordance with 
provisions of the First Geneva Convention.
The bombing of homes and the widespread destruction that affected 
the City of Fallujah amounts to criminal practice and cannot be 
justifi ed under military necessity. The CF initiated hostilities 
in Fallujah in retaliation for the killing of security company 
personnel in 2004.30 According to Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, the destruction and appropriation of property is a breach 
of the Convention. Such acts are also considered war crimes under 
Article 85(5) of API. Civilian objects are protected against reprisals 
according to Article 52 of API, which states:
 Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. 
Civilian objects are all objects which are not military 
objectives as defi ned in paragraph 2.
 Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so 
far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to 
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military  action.
 In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated 
to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or 
other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be 
so used.
During the second Fallujah Battle in 2004, the CF also violated 
provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention guaranteeing protection 
to cultural objects and places of worship.31
28 Ibid.
29 Bantekas, I and Nash, S.  International Criminal Law. 3rd ed. USA: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 2007. p. 113.
30 Floyd. C. 2010. Devastating Aftermath of Fallujah Battle accessible at http://
www.darkgovernment.com/news/devastating-aftermath-of-fallujah-battle/ 
(08April 2011).
31 Article 2 of Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Confl ict.Hague. 1954.
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iii) Violations against Medical Units
Under Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupying 
power is responsible to ensure that food and medical supplies are 
provided to the civilian population. In the event that resources in the 
occupied territory do not meet the needs of the civilian population, 
the occupying force is responsible for ensuring a supply of 
necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles. Furthermore, 
the occupying power is obligated under Article 56 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention to maintain the operations of medical facilities, 
services and hospitals and is prohibited from taking over civilian 
hospitals except in cases arising under Article 57, which permit the 
requisition of a civilian hospital only in times of urgent necessity; 
and only if the needs of civilians requiring medical treatment can be 
accommodated.32
The API obligates States to respect and protect medical personnel 
who provide services during any armed confl ict. Medical personnel 
are entitled to go to any place to provide services, taking into 
consideration measures of security and surveillance undertaken by 
the parties to the confl ict. Article 16 of the API seeks to ensure the 
protection of medical personnel, providing that persons engaged 
in medical activities shall not be compelled to perform acts or to 
carry out work contrary to medical ethics, or other medical rules, 
designed to benefi t wounded and sick persons; or pursuant to the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions or the API. The provisions 
also prohibit armed forces from preventing medical personnel from 
performing acts or from carrying out work required by those rules 
and provisions. Despite the obligations arising under the API, the 
CF prohibited the wounded from reaching hospitals and prohibited 
medical personnel from entering Fallujah City, thereby violating 
Article 16 of the API.33
32 Article 57 provides that “The Occupying Power may requisition civilian hos-
pitals only temporarily and only in cases of urgent necessity for the care of 
military wounded and sick, and then on condition that suitable arrangements 
are made in due time for the care and treatment of the patients and for the needs 
of the civilian population for hospital accommodation. The material and stores 
of civilian hospitals cannot be requisitioned so long as they are necessary for 
the needs of the civilian population”.
33 Shiner, P. and Williams, A, 2008.The Iraq War and International Law. USA: 
Hart Publishing. p 96.
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From the beginning of the battles in Fallujah, the CF targeted medical 
transport and hospitals in Fallujah, and also acted against the staff 
of medical units and facilities. On 7 November 2004, the CF laid 
siege to Fallujah General Hospital, arresting the medical personnel 
present as well as the patients.34This act violated Article 16 of the 
API and Article20 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. According to 
Article 20 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the doctors and other 
staff of Fallujah hospital were protected persons. In spite of the 
clear protection of medical personnel under IHL, the CF attacked the 
general hospital at Fallujah and arrested the personnel of the hospital.35
In addition, US airstrikes destroyed Nazzal Hospital in the centre 
of Fallujah without any prior warning.36Civilian hospitals are 
considered protected civilian objects. The protection of civilian 
hospitals is not lifted unless they are used for military purposes or 
a warning has been issued. In such case, only after a reasonable 
time limit has passed and the warning has been ignored, does the 
protection end.37 Alongside the attacks on hospitals, there were also 
attacks on ambulances.38 Although, the medical vehicles shall be 
respected and protected, in the same way as mobile medical units 
under Article 21 of API, such IHL obligations were not respected 
by the CF. Therefore, the CF is responsible for targeting the medical 
units and medical transportation in Fallujah during the attack. CF 
actions against hospitals and medical transport constitute violations 
of Article 16 of the API, as well as Articles 18 and 20 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.
iv) ICRC and the Hindrances from Carrying Out Its Duties 
in Wartime
Additionally, States are obligated to protect humanitarian 
organizations and permit them to pursue activities of a humanitarian 
nature. Article 81(1) of the API is concerned with the activities 
34 According to, interview with Gen. Rich Natonski. The commander of the 
Marine Division during the Fallujah Battles accessible at  http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=0vGmScPNB5U (27 March 2011).
35 Shiner, P. and Williams, A, 2008.The Iraq War and International Law. USA: 
Hart Publishing.p 96.
36 Ibid. p 96.
37 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 19.
38 Stjepan, G, M. Rules of Engagement? A Social Anatomy of an American War 
Crime Operation .Iron Triangle, Iraq.Algora Publishing, New York, 2008, p 73.
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of humanitarian organizations during times of armed confl ict and 
provides that all parties to a confl ict should grant all facilities within 
their control to enable the ICRC and other organisations to assist 
victims of confl icts, and any other measures undertaken in favour 
of the victims that the parties to the confl ict have consented. Article 
81(2) expressly extends the protection to national humanitarian 
organizations, such as national societies of the Red Crescent.39 In 
most cases, the CF prevented such organizations40 from entering 
Fallujah and nearby towns and villages although the intention was 
to help hundreds of thousands of Fallujah refugees in need of basic 
necessities, such as water, food, medicine, electricity and shelter.41
The Use of Illegal Weapons 
When the CF attacked Fallujah City during the Fallujah Battles 
they used illegal weapons, such as white phosphorus and incendiary 
weapons. The usage of these weapons by the CF was supported by 
the testimonies of witnesses and documentary evidence. This section 
will discuss the legal background concerning the banning of white 
phosphorus; evidence of the use of white phosphorus in Fallujah 
Battles; and the violation of IHL as the consequence.
a) Legal Background on Banning of White Phosphorus
IHL condones the use of weapons that incapacitate the enemy, but it 
is not an open ended acceptance.42 Certain types and uses of weapons 
are prohibited on humanitarian grounds. Weapons permitted for use 
by armed forces include illuminating weapons, to enable sight during 
night battles; camoufl age to conceal military units and personnel 
during the day; and weapons that can ignite material targets, such as 
ammunition or fuel stores. White phosphorous is suitable for many 
of these tasks because it ignites easily when exposed to oxygen and 
produces dense white smoke, capable of concealing or indicating 
potential military targets, as well as illuminating positions.
39 ICRC and IRCS.
40 Testimonies of Crimes Against Humanity in Fallujah, report of Conservation 
Centre of Environmental & Reserves in Fallujah (CCERF) is recorded in Iraqi 
Ministry of Planning & International Cooperative under No. 1Z2129.
41 Testimonies of Crimes Against Humanity in Fallujah, report of Conservation 
Centre of Environmental & Reserves in Fallujah (CCERF) is recorded in Iraqi 
Ministry of Planning & International Cooperative under No. 1Z2129.
42 
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White phosphorus can be delivered to a target by artillery, mortar 
or hand grenade due to its favourable smoke to weight ratio.43 
Commonly used white phosphorus projectiles include illuminating 
rounds, that dispense fl ares on parachutes; and smoke rounds, that 
either eject canisters or felt wedges that fall to the ground, burn and 
emit smoke. 
Although white phosphorus is chemical in nature, it is not classifi ed 
as a chemical weapon. In order to prove that white phosphorus can 
be classifi ed as a prohibited chemical weapon, it must be analysed in 
light of the Chemical Weapons Convention44 (CWC). In that instance 
one would have to demonstrate that it constitutes a de jure ‘chemical 
weapon’ in accordance with the Convention and that its military uses 
are prohibited by the CWC.45 If one considers white phosphorus as a 
chemical weapon, due to its various harmful physiological effects, it 
is a de jure toxic chemical and, as such, is prohibited by the CWC.46
Article 1(1) of the CWC contains comprehensive prohibitions on 
certain activities regarding the development, production, stockpiling 
and use of chemical weapons. However, this apparent total ban has 
to be read in the light of Article 2, the defi nitions and criteria that 
provide the foundation for the CWC, and Article 6, which describes 
weapons not prohibited under the Convention.47 
It may be worth adding that although white phosphorus can be 
considered both a ‘chemical weapon’ and a ‘toxic chemical’ under 
Articles 2(1) and 2(2), respectively, Article 2(9) allows the use 
of chemicals for military purposes that do not rely on the toxic 
properties of the chemical as a method of warfare.
43 MacLeod. I.J and Rogers A.P.V. 2009.The Use of WP and the Law of War. 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 10. 76.
44 Which was adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November 1992, in its 
Resolution entitled Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction 
(A/RES/47/39).
45 MacLeod, I.J. and Rogers, A.P.V. 2007.Yearbook of International Humanitarian 
Law.  Volume10.  pp. 75-97. No publisher. p 95.
46 Ibid. p 96.
47 According to Article 6 of CWC, which give the permission to develop and 
produce the chemical weapons and adopt the necessary measures to ensure 
those toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed and produced 
used within its territory of the state or in any other place under its jurisdiction 
or control for not prohibited purposes under CWC.
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The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)48 places 
restrictions and prohibitions on the use of certain weapons to 
prevent inhumane injuries to soldiers and indiscriminate injuries to 
non-combatants. The Convention was initially designed to deal only 
with international armed confl icts. However, with the rise of non-
international armed confl icts throughout much of the early 1990s, 
a protocol was adopted in 1996 that prohibited the use of mines, 
booby traps and other devices during internal armed confl icts.49
The CCW is an umbrella Convention, meaning that it only contains 
general provisions. The substantive provisions concerning the 
restriction and prohibition of specifi c weapons are found in the 
protocols to the Convention.  The CCW required States to consent to 
a minimum of two of the three protocols. Protocol III, which entered 
into force at the same time as the CCW, deals with incendiary 
weapons.50Article 2 of Protocol III prohibits the targeting of civilians 
and civilian objects when utilising incendiary weapons; prohibits the 
use of air-delivered incendiary weapons on targets in close proximity 
to civilians; prohibits the use of any other incendiary weapons in 
close proximity to civilian populations unless the damage can be 
limited to the military objective without signifi cant injury or loss of 
life to the civilian population; and prohibits the use of incendiary 
weapons in forests or other forms of plant cover except when such 
natural elements are used to camoufl age or conceal combatants or 
military objectives.
Thus, it is clear from the above reviews that although white 
phosphorus is chemical in nature, it is not classifi ed as a chemical 
weapon. However, due to its various harmful physiological effects, 
it is a de jure toxic chemical and, as such, is prohibited by the CWC.
48 UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious 
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects as amended on 21 December 2001(CCW) is 
usually referred to as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is 
also known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention.
49 Article 1(3) of the Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (1996 Amended Protocol II), entry 
into force 3 December 1998.
50 The United States of America, with reference to Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3, 
reserves the right to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located 
in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer 
casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons.
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b) Evidence of the Use of White Phosphorus in the Fallujah 
Battles
The CF used incendiary weapons (MK-77) during the second 
Fallujah Battle against the Fallujah civilians. These bombs have a 
similar destructive effect to napalm,51 and, for this reason, the CF 
violated both the CCW and Article 2(1) of Protocol III. 
According to Dr Ahmed of the Fallujah General Hospital,52 the rate 
of birth defects and cancers increased after the two battles in Fallujah 
in 2004 because of the pollution and radiation emitted from white 
phosphorus and other weapons. Dr Chris Busby53 studied the increase 
of cancer, birth defects and the issue of infant deaths that affected 
the population in Fallujah City after the battles, concluding that the 
cancer rate and infant mortality rate were alarmingly high compared 
to the statistics on the rates before the battles. White phosphorus 
and weapons containing depleted uranium had contaminated the 
environment, leading to a reduction in the sex ratio of the children 
born within one year of the end of the battles in 2004.54
On 8 November 2004, a documentary fi lm was aired about the 
battles of Fallujah on Italian television.  The fi lm alleged that the US 
forces had used artillery to fi re white phosphorus indiscriminately 
against human targets in November 2004, and, thus, had violated 
IHL governing the usage of incendiary devices.55 The CF used 
massive quantities of white phosphorus during the second battle of 
Fallujah,56which increased the cancer rates in children, particularly 
51 Testimony in the Fallujah, the Hidden Massacre fi lm, which were presented in 
Italian channel documentaries accessible at http://video.google.com/videoplay
?docid=8905191678365185391#  (25 March 2011).
52 Monitoring Net of Human Rights in Iraq Environmental. 2008. Prohibited 
Weapons Crisis, The Effects of Pollution on the Public Health in Fallujah. 
Presented to 7th session of the Human Rights Council. Geneva, 3 - 28 March.
53 Busby, C. Hamdan. M and  Ariabi. E. 2010.  Cancer, Infant Mortality and Birth 
Sex-Ratio in Fallujah, Iraq 2005-2009.International Journal of Environmental 
Research and Public Health accessible at http://www.mdpi.com/1660-
4601/7/7/2828/pdf .(09 November 2010)
54  Ibid.
55 Solis, G, D. The law of Armed Confl ict. Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2010, p 598.
56 Popham, P, the Independent Newspaper, 08 November 2005 accessible at 
http://www.thewe.cc/weplanet/news/americas/us/war_crimes_fallujah.html (19 
October 2010).
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leukaemia, as well as birth defects.57 The military journal of the US 
also noted the use of white phosphorus in the following passage:
White phosphorus proved to be effective and versatile 
munitions. We used it for screening missions at 
two breeches and, later in the fi ght, as a potent 
psychological weapon against the insurgents in trench 
lines and spider holes when we could not get effects 
on them with high explosive. We fi red ‘shake and bake’ 
missions at insurgents, using white phosphorus to fl ush 
them out and high explosive to take them out58
c) The Violations of IHL
The use of white phosphorus in Fallujah was illegal and inconsistent 
with IHL norms. The CF could not ascertain whether the people in 
Fallujah were combatants at the time of the attacks.  IHL requires 
armed forces to exercise the utmost regard for civilian life and, given 
the fact that the CF prevented civilians from leaving Fallujah during 
the battles, it was known that many civilians remained in Fallujah 
during the attacks. 
Although the UN Security Council authorised the CF to restore 
public order and safety, this authorization did not include permission 
to indiscriminately kill civilians. On the contrary, UN Security 
Council Resolution 1483, adopted in 2003,59 required the CF to 
treat civilians humanely and protect them from violence. Although 
the CF was charged with the restoration of public order and safety, 
the exception for the use of chemical weapons for law enforcement 
purposes does not apply for two reasons. First, the CF was considered 
an occupying force during the Fallujah Battles, placing them fi rmly 
within the scope of IHL norms. Secondly, the methods and means of 
the engagement were inconsistent with traditional law enforcement 
activities. 
57 Busby, C. Hamdan.M and Ariabi. E. 2010.  Cancer, Infant Mortality and Birth 
Sex-Ratio in Fallujah, Iraq 2005-2009.International Journal of Environ-
mental Research and Public Health accessible http://www.mdpi.com/1660-
4601/7/7/2828/pdf.  (09 November2010).
58 MacLeod, I.J. and Rogers, A.P.V. 2007.Yearbook of International Humanitar-
ian Law.  Volume10.  pp. 75-97. No publisher. p 78.
59 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4761st meeting, on 22 May 2003.
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Therefore, the use of white phosphorus by CF in the battles of 
Fallujah was contrary to the CWC and IHL norms relating to the 
status of the CF as an occupying power in Iraq and the means and 
methods associated with the military operations conducted while 
trying to restore public order and safety. The use of white phosphorus 
during the Fallujah Battles violates Articles 27 and 29 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, requiring civilians to be treated humanely 
and protected from violence; and Article 2 of CCW Protocol III, 
concerning the use of incendiary weapons near civilian populations.
Finally, the use of white phosphorus smoke entails the use of the 
weapon as a chemical weapon during military operations. The lawful 
use of chemicals for law enforcement purposes does not apply to the 
Fallujah Battles, since the CF violated the CWC by using a chemical 
weapon against civilians in Fallujah.
Legal Mechanisms to Prosecute the Perpetrators of War Crimes 
After discussing the violations of the IHL by the CF in Fallujah 
Battles, the violations constitute war crimes, particularly in regards 
to the intentional and/or indiscriminate targeting of civilians by 
military personnel. The assaults on the physical integrity and 
personal security of civilians; the bombing and destruction of 
civilian residential areas; and the destruction of cultural sites and 
places of worship were also violations of IHL. Members of the CF, 
acting as an occupying power, should bear the responsibility of the 
war crimes committed in Fallujah in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of international conventions. 
 
Several international legal mechanisms exist in contemporary 
practice to prosecute those responsible for violations of IHL and 
committed war crimes. Such mechanisms could be utilised to 
prosecute members of the CF who have committed violations of IHL 
and war crimes during the battles of Fallujah. Potential mechanisms 
include the following:  
 A special tribunal established by the UN Security Council, for 
the prosecution of war crimes committed during the Fallujah 
Battles.
 The national courts of States party to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention could prosecute members of the CF for war crimes. 
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 The national courts of Member States of the UN could 
prosecute the war criminals of the CF according to the 
principle of international criminal jurisdiction. 
 The International Criminal Court (ICC) mechanism could be 
utilised to prosecute members of the CF.
 
a) The Establishment of a Special Tribunal for War Crimes
The Security Council is empowered to act in relation to the events 
that occurred in Fallujah, particularly in regards to potential 
international criminal acts perpetrated by the CF against the people 
of Fallujah. The acts committed by the CF after its occupation of 
Iraq in 2003, given the international legal nature of the offences, 
are correctly denoted as ‘international crimes’.  Considering the 
number of unarmed and innocent civilians that were killed during 
the Fallujah Battles, the situation warrants consideration by the UN 
Security Council regarding the establishment of an international 
criminal tribunal for the prosecution of members of the CF that 
committed grave breaches of IHL.
The Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) pursuant to Resolution 
808(1993),60 empowering the tribunal to prosecute persons 
responsible for genocide; crimes against humanity in international 
and internal confl icts; grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions; 
and other violations of IHL committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia after January 1991.61The Security Council also 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
on 8 November1994 pursuant to Resolution 955(1994),62 which 
empowered the tribunal to prosecute individuals suspected to have 
committed genocide, crimes against humanity or serious violations 
of the laws of war in Rwanda between January and December 1994.63
On 14 August 2000, the Security Council requested, in Resolution 
60 Aksar, Y. Implementing International Humanitarian Law From The Ad Hoc 
Tribunals To A Permanent ICC,Routledge,USA and Canada, 2004,p20. 
Resolution 808, adopted by the UN Security Council on 22 February 1993.
61 Eve La,Haye.War Crimes in Internal Armed Confl icts, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2008, p 134.
62  The Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 3453rd meeting expressed 
its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, 
widespread and fl agrant violations of international humanitarian law have been 
committed in Rwanda.
63 Ibid. p 137.
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1315 (2000), that the Secretary-General of the UN, in cooperation 
with the Sierra Leone Government, establish an independent 
special court, recommending that its jurisdiction include crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and other violations of international 
law.64 According to Article 3 of the Agreement, dated 16 January 
2002, between the UN and the government of Sierra Leone, a 
prosecutor was appointed on the basis of a consultation between 
the two institutions. The Special Court is mandated to function in 
accordance with the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
which forms an integral part of the agreement between the UN and 
the government of Sierra Leone on the establishment of the Special 
Court.65Such UN Security Council Resolutions are considered to 
be a translation of the powers provided in Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter concerning the powers of the Security Council in cases that 
threaten international peace, or breach the peace, with the aim of 
restoring or maintaining international peace and security.66
Although the mission of the UN is to ensure international justice, 
security and peace, in reality, it may be diffi cult for the Security 
Council to establish an International Criminal Tribunal for Fallujah, 
because of the positions of the US and UK as permanent members 
with the right to veto Security Council resolutions. On the other 
hand, while the US has this right in the Security Council, that does 
not prevent the Security Council from attempting to establish an 
international criminal tribunal for acts committed in Fallujah if the 
international political equation ever permits such action. At present, 
both the UN system and the powers of the Security Council members 
would need to be reformed for such a resolution to pass.
b) Jurisdiction of National Courts under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention
Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires State parties 
to enact domestic legislation to make its provisions enforceable 
domestically, as well as search for and prosecute persons who 
are suspected to have committed grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions. 
64 Bantekas, I and Nash, S. International Criminal Law, Routledge Cavendish, 
USA, 2007, p 559.
65 Ibid. p 559.
66 Article 39 of the UN Charter.
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Article 148 of the Fourth Geneva Convention further provides that 
no State Party to the Convention is allowed to absolve itself or any 
other State Party to the Convention from liability resulting from 
grave breaches of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Article 89 of the API to Geneva Conventions provides that:
In the cases of serious violations to Geneva Conventions 
or of their Protocols, the High Contracting Parties 
undertake to act, jointly or individually, in cooperation 
with the United Nations and in conformity with the 
United Nations Charter.
These legal provisions provide State parties with criminal jurisdiction 
over grave breaches of IHL. While the possibility exists that a State 
Party to the Fourth Geneva Convention will attempt to prosecute 
any individual for committing war crimes in Fallujah Battles, such 
provisions are seemingly ignored by the international community 
due to the lack of political will.
c) Jurisdiction of National Courts of Member States of UN 
under the Principles of International Criminal Jurisdiction
The Geneva Conventions obligate State parties to take legislative 
and executive measures to suppress war crimes and prosecute 
persons accused of the commission of such crimes. In 1946, the 
UNGA noted, in Resolution 3, that all States within the international 
community had jurisdiction over persons accused of the commission 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, irrespective of whether 
the acts were considered criminal in the domestic law of the country 
in which they were committed. Furthermore, the UNGA emphasised 
that there was no statute of limitations for such crimes, irrespective 
of when they were committed. Universal jurisdiction applies to all 
grave breaches of IHL, allowing for the prosecution of any person, 
of any nationality, who is accused of committing such a crime, 
irrespective of where the crimes were committed. 
Universal jurisdiction allows a complainant of one country to 
serve a writ against  a national of another country while the alleged 
offender is physically present in the country of the complainant. 
A familiar precedent is that of former Chilean President General 
Pinochet, who was detained following his arrival in London for back 
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surgery in September of 1998.67 Pinochet was detained as a result 
of a Spanish extradition warrant regarding his involvement in the 
torture and disappearance of Spanish citizens, as well as the torture, 
disappearance and deaths of Chilean nationals during his tenure in 
offi ce. The warrant was exercised by the British police in the UK 
due to an extradition treaty between the UK and Spain.68 Similarly, 
Belgium has enacted domestic war crimes legislation covering 
serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols that allow for the prosecution of persons for war crimes 
irrespective of where they had been committed.69
d) The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
The Rome Statute established a permanent institution with 
jurisdiction over persons alleged to have committed serious war 
crimes. Civilians are protected by the ICC because the institution can 
prosecute individuals that have committed grave breaches of IHL. 
The possibility exists for persons who committed war crimes during 
the Fallujah Battles to be referred to the prosecutor of the ICC by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the event 
that this occurs, the ICC is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the 
persons who have committed any of the international crimes referred 
to in Article 5 of the Rome Statute. If the criminal acts committed 
fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the Security Council can refer 
the matter to the Prosecutor of the ICC.70
However, the ICC should not be utilized to by-pass or contradict 
the primary role and function of the Security Council in matters of 
peace and security.71 Article 23 of the International Law Commission 
(ILC) draft statute entitled ‘Action by the Security Council’ depicts 
the relationship between the Security Council and ICC, stating:72
67 Van Cleave. R. A,‘The Role of United States Federal Courts in Extradition 
Matters: The Rule of Noninquiry, Preventive Detention, and Comparative 
Legal Analysis’ (1999)13 (1) US. Federal Courts in Extradition Matters, p 27.
68 Mandel, M.How America Gets Away With Murder, Pluto Press, London, 2004, 
p 224.Decision by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, 15 January 
1999 (Pinochet II).(2000) 1AC 119.
69 Ibid. p 230.
70 Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.
71 Gowlland-Debbas, V. ‘The Relationship between the Security Council and the 
Projected International Criminal Court’ (1998) Confl ict and Security Law, p 99.
72 Ibid.
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 The Security Council has the right to trigger the jurisdiction 
of the ICC by referral to it of particular matters when it is 
acting under Chapter VII of UN Charter, thus providing a 
legal basis for the exercise of its competence. Therefore, the  
Security Council has the right to refer the crimes in Fallujah 
Battles, which were committed by CF to ICC.
 The Security Council must defi ne the term ‘act of aggression’, 
as the term has not been defi ned in the Rome Statute. 
According to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the UN Security 
Council is charged with determining whether or not an act 
of aggression has taken place. Such a determination must be 
made prior to such a matter being referred to the Prosecutor 
of the ICC.
 The UN Security Council is empowered to prevent the 
investigation or prosecution of persons by the Prosecutor of 
the ICC pursuant to a resolution issued by the UN Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Conclusion 
This article provides an IHL analysis of acts committed by the CF 
during the Fallujah Battles between April and November 2004. 
The analysis was premised upon IHL instruments, such as the 
Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols and other relevant 
conventions, and explored grave breaches of IHL that occurred 
during the hostilities.
This article demonstrates that the CF has violated Common Article 
1 of the Geneva Conventions, which requires that parties to the 
Geneva Conventions respect the Conventions in all circumstances.73 
The analysis has confi rmed that actions of the CF in Fallujah 
violated Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions and Article 
33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the basis that the CF did 
not adequately protect civilians from military attacks. The military 
acts of the CF during the Fallujah Battles amounted to collective 
punishment and aggression against the civilians and their property. 
Such crimes are considered grave breaches of IHL, specifi cally 
under Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The civilians 
73 Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
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and their property were subjected to repeated attacks, rather than 
enjoying protected status from the occupying power as mandated by 
the Geneva Conventions. 
The CF was responsible to ensure the protection of civilians in 
Fallujah during wartime because of the CF’s status as the occupying 
power in Iraq. However, the CF not only violated IHL by attacking 
civilians, but also through the use of white phosphorus in close 
proximity to civilians in Fallujah. Although the CF was authorized to 
restore public order and safety in Iraq, its actions in Fallujah amount 
to international crimes and the individuals responsible should be 
held accountable. The legal mechanisms that may be used for the 
prosecution of members of the CF who committed international 
criminal consist of special tribunals established by the UN Security 
Council, national courts and the ICC.  
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